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For if anyone, no matter who, were given the opportunity of choosing amongst all the nations of 
the world the beliefs he thought best, he would inevitably, after careful consideration of their 
relative merits, choose those of his own country.  Everyone without exception believes his own 
native customs, and the religion he was brought up in, to be the best…There is abundant 
evidence that this is the universal feeling about the ancient customs of one’s country. One might 
recall…an account told of Darius.   When he was king of Persia, he summoned the Greeks who 
happened to be at this court and asked them what they would take to eat the dead bodies of their 
fathers. They replied that they would not do it for any money in the world.  Later, in the presence 
of the Greeks…he asked some Indians…who do in fact eat their parents’ dead bodies, what they 
would take to burn them. They uttered a cry of horror and forbade him to mention such a 
dreadful thing. One can see by this what custom can do and Pindar, in my opinion, was right 
when he called it ‘king of all.’ 
 
Herodotus, The Histories (3.38)
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This paper provides a model of individual decisionmaking in the presence of social 
interactions.  By social interactions, we refer to interdependencies between individual decisions 
and the decisions and characteristics of others within a common group. In virtually any economic 
model, the decisions of one agent will be influenced by the behaviors and characteristics of 
others; what distinguishes the perspective we adopt is that the interdependences we study 
directly link individuals.  By way of contrast, agents in a market are influenced by a common  2 
price that reflects the participation of each individual in the market.  The sorts of phenomena we 
study are different as these describe ways to formalize ideas such as peer group influences, 
whereby behaviors of one agent alter the preferences of others and are not mediated by how 
individuals affect prices in a market equilibrium.   As such, social interactions constitute an 
example of the type of externalities described in Arrow and Hahn (1971, chapter 6, section 2).  
Within economics, there has developed an increasing recognition that social interactions 
may play a major role in explaining a range of individual behaviors.  In many respects, the new 
literature on social interactions addresses a famous criticism of economics made in Granovetter 
(1985), 
 
“Classical and neoclassical economics operates…with an atomized and undersocialized 
conception of human action…The theoretical arguments disallow by hypothesis any impact of 
social structure and social relations…” (pg. 55) 
 
In fact, one of the appealing aspects of the new literature on social interactions is that it has 
facilitated the introduction of sociological concepts and perspectives into economic modeling.  In 
turn, the economics literature on social interactions has shown how these ideas may be 
formalized and extended using the formal rigor of economic theory.   More important, the 
approach we take represents a first step in an integration of individual-based and social-based 
explanations, a perspective whose importance is well described in Arrow (1994) 
 
“It is clear that the individualist perspective does play an essential role in understanding social 
phenomena.  Particularly striking is the emergent nature of social phenomena, which may be 
very far from the motives of the individual interactions. ” (pg. 3) 
 
As such, we regard the social interactions literature as a successful example of how social 
science benefits from the breaking down of disciplinary barriers. 
There is now a large body of theoretical and empirical studies of social interactions.  In 
terms of theory, two main approaches have been taken. One strand of the social interactions 
literature has focused on the implications of social interactions in predetermined groups.     
Akerlof (1997) and Brock and Durlauf (1999,2001a,b), for example, consider the role of the 
interactions structure within a group on group-level outcomes. Models such as Loury (1977) and 
Lundberg and Startz (1998) focus on the effects of social interactions within ethnic groups with 
specific attention to how differences in initial conditions have long run effects. In contrast, work  3 
by Bénabou (1993,1996), Durlauf (1996a,b) and Hoff and Sen (2000) has primarily focused on 
the implications of social interactions for group formation, specifically in the context of 
residential neighborhoods.  In these models, children are influenced by the neighborhoods in 
which they grow up through factors such as the local tax base, the types of role models that are 
present and via peer group influences. Models of this type can produce poverty traps as poverty 
among parents is transmitted to children when children are consigned to neighborhoods whose 
interactions adversely affect their subsequent economic status; poverty among parents, because 
of its affect on children’s neighborhoods, thus transmits economic status across generations.  
One limitation of the existing theoretical models of social interactions is the relatively weak 
connections between these two approaches.
2 
The empirical literature on social interactions has been dominated by attention to the 
effects of residential neighborhoods.  A wide range of analyses have produced regression 
evidence that links individual outcomes with neighborhood (i.e. groups defined by geographic 
proximity) characteristics; examples include Aizer and Currie (2002), Brooks-Gunn et al (1993), 
Corcoran et al (1992), Brewster (1994), Datcher (1982), Ginther, Haveman and Wolfe (2000), 
Ioannides and Zabel, (2002a,b), Nigmatullin (2002), Plotnik and Hoffman (1999), Sirakaya 
(2002), South and Baumer (2000), and South and Crowder (1999). Alternative strategies for 
uncovering neighborhood effects using aggregated data have been developed by Glaeser, 
Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) and Topa (2001).  In addition, there is now a literature that 
moves beyond the assumption that geographic proximity determines interactions and attempts to 
identify which sorts of groups in fact produce social interactions. Aizer and Currie (2002) and 
Conley and Topa (2002) are interesting empirical analyses that compare alternative groups (e.g. 
groups defined by geographic proximity versus common ethnicity) in terms of the social 
interactions with which they are associated. 
Empirical work on neighborhood effects has been buttressed by two recent developments.  
The first is the use of “quasi-experimental” data produced by government interventions that alter 
the neighborhood choices of certain families.  Examples of such programs include the Gautreaux 
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program (Rosenbaum (1995) and Rosenbaum and Popkin (1991)) and the Moving to 
Opportunity Demonstration (Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001), Ludwig, Duncan and Hirshfeld 
(2001)).  Each of these programs is interesting because each constitutes a government 
intervention in which a set of poor families are given incentives to move to more affluent 
neighborhoods, thereby permitting comparison with similar families who did not receive such 
incentives.  These studies generally find improved outcomes, especially for children, among 
families that move.   
The second is the development of a detailed data set that measures attitudes and beliefs 
across neighborhoods, called the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods.  
As illustrated in Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls (1999) and Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 
(1997), this data can illuminate some of the structural relationships that underlie the correlations 
that are found in other studies between neighborhood attributes and individual outcomes.  For 
example, these studies find that “collective efficacy,” by which they mean the willingness of 
neighborhood members to provide public goods that contribute to social order (one example is 
monitoring the children of neighbors) appears strongly associated with lower crime rates. 
A major weakness of the social interactions literature as it is currently constituted is the 
absence of strong connections between theory and empirics.  By this, we mean that there has 
been little effort to employ theoretical models of social interactions in structural estimation. Our 
previous work on social interactions, Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) has attempted to address this 
limitation by developing models of binary choice that are directly econometrically 
implementable.  This paper extends that work to account for multinomial choice. This 
generalization leads to a number of new methodological insights as well as allows for the 
application of theoretical models of social interactions to a broader range of phenomena than was 
previously possible. 
Section I outlines a basic choice model with social interactions.  Section II analyzes a 
version of this general framework in which individual choices follow a multinomial logit 
structure. Section III considers the econometric implementation of the multinomial logit model 
we have developed with specific attention to identification problems that may arise when social 
interactions are present. Section IV discusses how to extend our basic framework to account for 
alternative error specifications.  We show that the basic theoretical and econometric features of 
the multinomial logit model apply quite generally. Section V considers how to integrate  5 
decisions on behaviors with decisions on group memberships.  Section VI contains summary and 
conclusions.   A Technical Appendix contains all proofs. 
 
I.  Modeling social interactions 
 
We consider I  individuals who are members of a common group g .  Our objective is to 
probabilistically describe the individual choices of each i,  i ω  (a choice that is taken from the 
elements of some set of possible behaviors  i Ω ) and thereby characterize the vector of choices of 
all members of the group, ω .   
From the perspective of theoretical modeling, it is useful to distinguish between three 
sorts of influences on individual choices.  These influences have different implications for how 
one models the choice problem. These components are  
 
i h , a vector of deterministic (to the modeler) individual-specific characteristics associated with 
individual i,   
 






i µ ω , the subjective beliefs individual i possesses about behaviors in the group, expressed as 
a probability measure over those behaviors.  
 
Each of these components will be treated as a distinct argument in the payoff function that 
determines individual choices.  As we shall see, each plays a distinct role in the analysis. 
The deterministic and random individual-specific characteristics capture the “standard” 
determinants of individual choices that one finds in economic models.  Hence, if  i ω  represents 
whether one is deciding between college and employment, or military enlistment,  i h  may include 
variables such as educational attainment of one’s parents, or the quality of one’s high school; the  6 
i ε  vector may include unobservable variables such as “true” intellectual ability or tastes.   The 
distinction between deterministic and random characteristics will prove to play an important role 
in both the theoretical and the econometric analysis of the model. 
From the perspective of individual decisionmaking, what distinguishes our framework 
from the standard discrete choice approach is the possibility that individual choices are affected 
by  ()
e
i µ ω , the beliefs an individual has about others.  This interdependence in fact lies at the 
heart of the new literature on social interactions.  In modeling social interactions across 
individuals, we assume that these interactions are mediated by beliefs, i.e. individual i is 
influenced by what he thinks others are doing, not by their actual behavior per se.  This 
assumption provides a great deal of analytical convenience.  Its appropriateness will depend on 
the context under study, and in particular the size of the group in which interactions occur.  So, 
while the assumption seems relatively natural when one is interested in social interactions at an 
ethnic group level, it is clearly problematic in describing interactions between a pair of best 
friends. 
Individual choices  i ω  are characterized as representing the maximization of some payoff 
function V , 
 
  () () argmax , , ,
i
e
ii i i Vh λ ωλ µ ωε ∈Ω =  (1) 
 
Thus, we treat the decision problem facing an individual as a function of preferences (embodied 
in the specification of V ), constraints (embodied in the specification of  i Ω ) and beliefs 
(embodied in the specification of   ()
e
i µ ω ).  As such, our analysis is based on completely 
standard microeconomic reasoning to describe individual decisions. 
This basic choice model is closed by imposing self-consistency between subjective 
beliefs  ()
e
i µ ω  and the objective conditional probabilities () | i F µω , where  i F  denotes the 
information available to agent i.  We assume that agents know the deterministic characteristics 
of others as well as themselves and also understand the structure of the individual choice 
problems that are being solved.  This means that subjective beliefs must obey 
  7 
  () () () , 
ee
ij j hj µω µ ω µω =∀  (2) 
 
where the right hand of this equation is the objective conditional probability measure generated 
by the model; self-consistency is equivalent to rational expectations in the usual sense.  From the 
perspective of modeling individual behaviors, it is typically assumed that agents do not account 
for the effect of their choices on the decisions of others via expectations formation. In this sense, 
this framework embodies an expectations-based version of a Nash equilibrium.  
This general structure illustrates how social interactions models preserve the individual 
choice-based logic of microeconomics.  Their novelty lies in the interdependences in choices that 
are induced by including  ()
e
i µ ω  as an argument in individual payoffs and imposing self-
consistency.  From the perspective of economic theory, the interesting properties of these models 
emerge as a result of this interdependence. 
   
II.  A multinomial logit approach to social interactions  
i. basic  setup 
 
In order to understand the implications of social interactions for the equilibrium 
distribution of choices within a population, it is necessary to specialize this general behavioral 
description.  We do this in three steps.   
First, we assume that each agent faces a common choice set with L discrete possibilities, 
i.e.  { } 0,1, , 1 i L Ω= − K .  The common choice set assumption is without loss of generality, since 
if agents face different choice sets, one can always assume their union is the common set and 
then specify that certain choices have payoff of −∞  for certain agents. 
Second, we assume that each choice l produces utility for i according to: 
 
  ,, ,,
e
il il il il VhJ pε =+ + (3) 
  8 
Following the notation of the previous section,  , il h  denotes the deterministic private utility agent 
i receives from the choice,  ,
e
il Jp  denotes the social utility from the choice, and  , il ε  denotes 
random private utility from the choice.  The social utility term contains both a measure of the 
strength of social utility,  J , and the agent’s subjective expectation of the percentage of agents in 
the neighborhood who make the same choice  ,
e
il p . This is the natural generalization of the 
conformity effect model developed in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) and is also employed in 
Bayer and Timmins (2001).   
Third, we assume that the errors  , il ε  are independent across i and are doubly 
exponentially distributed with index parameterβ , i.e. 
() () () , exp exp il µ ε ςβ ς γ ≤= −+ (4)
 
where  γ  is Euler’s constant. This assumption is of course standard in the discrete choice 
literature and is the basis of multinomial logit specifications; see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 
(1992) for discussion of the substantive behavioral restrictions that this specification imposes. 
The parameterβ  measures the dispersion in the random utility terms; higher β  implies lower 
dispersion. 
  These assumptions may be combined to produce a full description of the choice 
probabilities for each individual, () ,, ,
e
ii j i j lh p j µω =∀ .  The probability that agent i chooses l 
equals the probability that the payoff associated with this choice is maximal among all payoffs 
available to the agent, i.e. 
() () , , {0... 1} , , , , , ,a r g m a x ,
ee e
ii j i j j L i j i j i ji j i j lh p j h J p lh p j µω µ ε ∈− =∀ = + + =∀ (5)
  
This is a standard calculation under the double exponential assumption for the random payoff 
terms and leads to the canonical multinomial logit probability structure (cf. Anderson, dePalma 
and Thisse (1992, section 2.6)): 
  9 




























When there are only two choices, this is the model studied in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b).  
Since the random payoff terms are independent across agents, the joint choice probabilities may 
































   
Finally, we characterize self-consistency as defined by eq. (2).  We assume that the 
information set of each agent includes both the empirical distribution of deterministic payoff 
terms across choices and agents as well as the probability distribution from which random utility 
terms are drawn. We also assume that the number of agents is sufficiently large that each agent 
ignores the effect of his own choice on the average.
3 As self-consistent beliefs imply that the 
subjective choice probabilities 
e
l p  equal the objective expected values of the percentage of 




























                                                 
3 In cases where the number of agents is small, it is perhaps more natural to express an 
individual’s payoff as depending on the actual choices of others. There are subtle issues that need 
to be dealt with in the small numbers case as this essentially means that agents know the  , il ε ’s 
for others in the group; see Kooreman and Soetevent (2002). Nevertheless, a small group 
approach is closely related to our framework.  10 
where  h F  is the empirical probability distribution for the vector of deterministic terms  , il h .  It is 
straightforward to verify that under the Brouwer fixed point theorem, at least one such fixed 





To understand the properties of this model, it is useful to focus on the special case where 
, 0 , il hi l =∀ .  For this special case, the choice probabilities (and hence the expected distribution 
of choices within a neighborhood) are completely determined by the compound parameter J β .  
An important question is whether and how the presence of interdependencies produces multiple 
equilibria for the choice probabilities in a neighborhood. In order to develop some intuition as to 
why the number of equilibria is connected to the magnitude of J β , it is helpful to consider two 
extreme cases for the compound parameter, namely  0 J β =  and  J β =∞ .  We consider each 
case in turn.  
For the case 0 J β = , one can immediately verify that there exists a unique equilibrium for 




=   l ∀ . This follows from the fact that under the 
assumption that  , 0 , il hi l =∀ , all individual heterogeneity in choices come from the realizations 
of  , il ε , a process whose elements are independent and identically distributed across choices and 
individuals.  Since all agents are ex ante identical, the aggregate choice probabilities must be 
equal.   





is also an equilibrium if J β =∞  since conditional on these probabilities, the symmetries in 
payoffs associated with each choice that led to this equilibrium when  0 J β =  are preserved as 
there is no difference in social utility across choices.  However, this is not the only equilibrium. 
To see why this is so, observe that for any pair of choices l and l′  for which the aggregate 












=  (9) 
 
for any  J β . This follows from the fact that each agent is ex ante identical.  Thus, it is immediate 
that any set of equilibrium probabilities that are bounded away from 0 will become equal as 




=  for some subset of b  choices and  0 l p =  for the other Lb −  choices is an equilibrium.  










 ∑  different equilibrium probability 
configurations.   Recalling that β  indexes the density of random utility and J measures the 
strength of interdependence between decisions, this case, when contrasted with  0 J β =  
illustrates why the strength of these interdependences and the degree of heterogeneity in random 
utility interact to determine the number of equilibria. 
These extreme cases may be refined to produce a more precise characterization of the 
relationship between the number of equilibria and the value of J β . In general, this relationship is 
highly complex as it is necessary to account for the distribution of  , il h  across iand  l within a 
given group in order to develop precise statements as to how the model parameters determine the 
number of equilibria.   Theorem 1 characterizes how the magnitude of J β determines the number 
of equilibria in this case. 
  
Theorem 1.  Multiple equilibria in the multinomial logit model with social interactions 
 
Suppose that individual choices are characterized by eq. (6) with self-consistent beliefs, i.e., that 
beliefs are consistent with eq. (8).  Assume that  ,  , il hk i l =∀ . Then there will exist at least three 





  12 
When  2 L = , this theorem reduces to the characterization of multiple equilibria with binary 
choices in Brock and Durlauf (2001a).
4  
In general, it is difficult to extend Theorem 1 to account for cases where  , il h  is 
nonconstant.  The reason for this is that the equilibrium aggregate choice probabilities induced 
by the interaction of private incentives and social incentives will in general depend on the 
complete distribution of  , il h  across choices and individuals.  There are some special cases where 
one can establish precise results.  For example, suppose that  0 il i hh g −= {1... 1} lL ∀∈ − . In this 
case, the private deterministic utility of choice 0 differs from that of the other choices.  In this 




>  there exists 
a threshold T  for g such that if 0 gT << there are multiple equilibria whereas if gT >  the 
equilibrium is unique.   
There is a common basic intuition for Theorem 1 and similar results in Brock and 
Durlauf (2001a,b) that relate the number of choice equilibria to the interplay between the 
strength of social utility, J, the levels of deterministic private payoffs,  , il h , and the parameter that 
indexes the degree of dispersion in random private utility, β .  Multiple equilibria arise when the 
social utility effects on individual behavior can induce self-consistent bunching on a subset of 
choices.  A positive  J  induces a tendency towards self-consistent bunching.  Such a tendency is 
counteracted by the private utility components.  One way in which this tendency towards self-
consistent bunching may be countered is via the distribution of  , il h ; these private deterministic 
payoff components can, if sufficiently skewed, render the aggregate choice probabilities unique.  
A similar effect can occur via the realizations of the random payoff terms  , il ε .  With respect to 
Theorem 1, if the random utility components are sufficiently dispersed (i.e. β  is small), then a 
                                                 
4 Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) use slightly different normalizations for the analysis of 
binary choice.  Specifically, choices are indexed  1 −  and 1 and the social utility component is 
written as  Jm where m  is the expected value of the choices in the group. For this reason, the 
threshold theorem in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) is stated in terms of whether or not 1 J β >  
rather than  1
2
J β
>  as is done here.   13 
sufficient percentage of agents will have draws of random utility such that their choices are 
dominated by one of the  , il ε ’s regardless of the strength of social utility, leaving too small a 
percentage of agents to engage in self-consistent bunching, as the social utility associated with 
the bunching depends on the percentage of agents that make the choice.  Put differently, the 
presence of social utility effects, considered in isolation, do not identify what choices an 
individual makes, only that choices across individuals will be correlated.  This induces a degree 
of freedom in the determination of what choices are actually made. (This is the same intuition for 
the presence of multiple equilbria in various coordination failure models; see Cooper (1999) for a 
survey.)  The individual-specific deterministic and random terms, considered in isolation, do 
produce unique choices for the population.  The interplay between the strength of these 
influences determines the number of equilibrium choice configurations.  
An interesting feature of Theorem 1 is the fact that the condition for multiple equilibria 
depends on the number of choices.  As such, the theorem explains simulation evidence in Bayer 
and Timmins (2001) which indicated that multiple equilibria seem less likely in models when 
more choices are involved.  This theorem makes their findings precise and provides some insight 
as to why they occur.  Intuitively, the reason that the number of choices raises the threshold 
value of  J β  necessary for multiple equilibria is the assumption that the random utility terms are 
independent.  This independence means that the percentage of individuals in a population whose 
behavior is determined by their random utility (because of an extremely large draw for one of the 
choices relative to the others) increases in the number of choices, leaving a smaller percentage of 
the population susceptible to self-consistent bunching due to the influence of  l Jp . Higher 
percentages of agents whose behavior is determined by the random utility draws will reduce the 
potential for social utility to produce multiple self-consistent equilibria. 
 
iii. cooperative  equilibria 
 
In this section, we consider the formulation of a cooperative analog to the noncooperative 
model we have studied in Section II.ii. The welfare properties of the noncooperative equilibria 
are best understood when explicitly contrasted with the equilibria that would occur under some 
sort of cooperation. One way to do this is to develop an analogous social planner’s problem for 
the set of choices under consideration. Such an approach requires the use of relatively  14 
sophisticated models and techniques from the statistical mechanics literature.  Following ideas 
originally developed in Brock (1993) and subsequently elaborated in the present context in 
Brock and Durlauf (2001a), Brock and Durlauf (2002) proposed a way of formulating the 
behavior of a particular benign social planner (i.e. one whose objective function includes the sum 
of the deterministic payoff components of the individual agents) in such a way that the social 
planner's choice of configuration ω  is given by a probability measure  () µ ω  of the form 
  















 ∑∑∑  (10) 
 
In this expression,  I Z  is a normalization and the ˆl p ’s are the empirical percentages of choices in 














 where  () 1 i l ω =  denotes the indicator function for the choice of  l by agent i. 
In comparison with the probability measure that characterizes choices for noncooperative 
equilibrium (eq. (7)), the important difference is that the social planner's problem uses empirical 
probabilities in modeling the interdependence of individual choices whereas the noncooperative 
equilibrium is based on population probabilities (i.e. the agents’ rational expectations concerning 
the choices of others.)  This difference is to be expected since a planner will account for how the 
choices of one actor affect others in ways that are ruled out in the noncooperative case.  This 
feature makes the probability structure much more difficult to analyze.  For example, the joint 
probability measure for the planner does not factor into a product of marginal probabilities (each 
representing one individual’s choice) as it does in the noncooperative case.  This means that 
there is a direct channel by which each agent’s choice becomes correlated with the choices of 
others.  The nature of this direct dependence as I ⇒ ∞  plays a key role in determining the 
aggregate behavior of the population.   15 
We conjecture that as
* ˆ ,   lw l I pp l ⇒ ∞ ⇒ ∀ , (w denotes weak convergence), the vector 
* p with typical element 
*
l p  solves  
 
 
*1 argmax lim ln pI I p IZ
−
⇒∞ =  (12) 
 
The Brock and Durlauf (2002) assertion (their equation (12)) that (12) holds is incorrect 
as stated because the sufficient conditions for (12) to hold are left out.  For example, when  2 L =  
and  , 0 il h = , if  1
2
J β
>  then there are two global maxima to (12) which means that the limit of 
the sample mean  ˆ p is a mixture with a two point support; Ellis (1986 p. 100) provides a 
complete analysis of the binary case when  , il hh = . For the binary case with random  , il h , results 
by Amaro de Matos and Perez (1991) may be adapted to locate sufficient conditions for a result 
such as (12) to hold.  In fact, for the binary choice case, these results suggest that the usual 
central limit theory for suitably normalized sums such as  ( ( )) ii
i
E ωω − ∑  needs to be modified. 
Although the usual central limit theorem results hold as long as 1) the value of  J β  does not 
equal the critical value around which multiple equilibria emerge and 2)  , il h  is constant (Ellis 
(1985, Theorem V.9.4)), the situation changes when the variance of  , il h  is positive even when 
the global maximum of (10) is unique and various regularity conditions are imposed (Amaro de 
Matos and Perez (1991, Theorem 2.8, (a))). More precisely, the appropriately normalized sum of 
deviations around the mean will converge to a mixture of normals, not a normal distribution as 
occurs in standard cases.  Further, small changes in the distribution of  . il h  can lead to large 
differences in the global maximum of (12).  
We do not know whether a result such as (12) holds for the multinomial case with general 
, il h . For the case where the global maximum to (10) is unique, there are a number of existing 
results that suggest that our conjecture is true.  For example, Ellis and Wang (1990) analyze the 
model (10) where  , 0 il h =  , il ∀ and show there is a threshold  T J  such that if  T JJ < , then 
ˆl p converges weakly to 
1
L
 .  We will pursue a full analysis of (12) in subsequent work.  16 
 
 
III. Econometric  implementation 
 
i.  Basic framework  
 
An important feature of the theoretical framework is that it can also be used for 
econometric analysis.
5  The multinomial logit property for the individual choices allows one to 
construct a likelihood function for data taken for I  individuals who are sampled across groups.  
Since a typical data set will contain observations on individuals in different groups, we 
generalize our notation so that  () gi denotes the group of agent i;  ω  is now the vector of 
choices in a given cross-group sample of individuals. Finally, each individual within a group is 
modeled as possessing identical beliefs about the percentage of choices within the group, so that 
for choice l within group () gi each group member shares a common belief concerning the 
expected percentage of group members that are choosing l,  () ,
e
g il p .  Following Manski (1993), 
the dependence of individual behavior on  () ,
e
g il p  is known as an endogenous effect, in order to 
highlight the notion that the (expected) choices of one agent influence the choices of another. 
In empirical work on neighborhood effects the generic deterministic private incentive  , il h  
is usually assumed to depend on two types of observables: an r-dimension vector of individual 
characteristics  i X  and an s-dimension vector of neighborhood characteristics  () g i Y , also known 
as contextual effects. Manski (1993) provides the first formal discussion of this dichotomy, 
which is irrelevant to the development of the theory of social interactions but has important 
implications for econometric analysis. Operationally, it is standard to assume 
 
                                                 
5 A range of econometric issues that arise for models of social interactions have been 
studied in Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b), Manski (1993), and Moffitt (2001). Brock and Durlauf 
(2001b) is the study that most closely focuses on issues concerning discrete choice models, also 
extending the analysis of identification to duration data.  17 
  () , . il l l i l g i hk c X d Y ′′ =+ +  (13) 
 
There is no necessary reason why the same elements of  i X  and  () g i Y  should affect the payoff of 
each choice; one can allow for this by setting particular elements of  l c  and  l d  to zero.   
Under the assumption that  , il ε  is independent of  i X  and  () g i Y  , il ∀ , the likelihood 
function for a collection of choices ω  will equal 
 




Il l i l l i gi gi l
l i
Z kc Xd Y J p l ββ β β ω
−  ′′ ++ + = 
 ∑ ∏  (14) 
 
where  I Z  is the normalization 
 
() () () , exp
e
Il l i l l gi gi l
l i
Zk c X d Y J p ββ β β
 ′′ =+ + + 
 ∑ ∏ (15)
 
and beliefs are subject to a set of constraints on the subjective beliefs for members of each group 
() gi, 
 
  () () () () () , () , , E, ,
gi
ee
gil X gil gi l gi p pFY p l =∀  (16) 
 
where 
() g i X F is the empirical distribution of  i X  within group  ( ) gi and expectations are formed on 
the basis of the probabilities defined by (15). This set of constraints imposes self-consistency in 
expected choice probabilities across groups and choices in the way that corresponds to the 
analysis in Section II.   
As is standard for multinomial logit models, the complete set of model parameters is not 
identified.  It is therefore necessary to impose some normalizations; we follow McFadden (1984, 
p. 1413) and impose the normalizations that  00 0 0 0,  0,   0 ,  0 kc dJ == = =  and  =1 β . 
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ii. identification 
 
As originally recognized and analyzed in Manski (1993) and further analyzed in Brock 
and Durlauf (2001b), Minkin (2002) and Moffitt (2001), there are possible identification 
problems in social interactions models due to the relationship between contextual effects  () g i Y  
and the equilibrium expected group choice probabilities  () , g il p . Specifically, Manski (1993) 
shows how for a class of linear models of group effects, collinearity between particular 
contextual effects and endogenous effects (in our context, the () , g il p ’s) that represent self-
consistent beliefs about aspects of behaviors in the group can induce nonidentification.   
However, in contrast to the linear case, identification can hold for our model, as described in the 
following theorem. 
 
Theorem 2. Identification of the multinomial choice model with neighborhood effects 
 
Let the true data generating process be given by (14)-(16) with the normalization     
00 0 0 0,  0,   0 ,  0 kc dJ == = =  and  =1 β .  Assume  
 
i)  the joint support of  () , i g i X Y  is not contained in a proper linear subspace of 
rs R
+  
ii)  the support of  () g i Y  is not contained in a proper linear subspace of
s R ,  
iii)  no linear combination of elements of i X  and  () g i Y  is constant,  
iv)  for each choice l, there exists at least one group  l g  such that conditional on 
l g Y , i X  is 
not contained in a proper linear subspace of  
r R ,  
v)  none of the elements of  () g i Y  possesses bounded support,  
vi)  () , g il p  is not constant across neighborhoods,  
vii)  , il ε , the random utility terms for each individual, are independent of his associated  i X  
and () g i Y  and independent and identically distributed across choices and individuals.  
  19 
Then the true set of model parameters () 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 ,,,, , , , , LL L L kcdJ k c d J −− − − K  is identified relative to 
any distinct alternative. 
 
The proof of this theorem may be found in the appendix and is a generalization of a 
theorem on identification of neighborhood effects for binary choices found in Brock and Durlauf 
(2001a,b).  The key to identification in this model is that, because models of discrete choice are 
inherently nonlinear in the various control variables (since choice probabilities are bounded), 
contextual effects and endogenous effects (in this case, the choice probabilities) cannot be 
linearly dependent.  What the theorem in essence requires is three things. First, it is necessary 
that the data contain sufficient intraneighborhood variation within at least one neighborhood to 
ensure that  l k  and  l c  are identified  l ∀ .  Second, there must be enough interneighborhood 
variation in  () g i Y  to ensure that  l d  and  l J  are identified  l ∀  because of the nonlinear relationship 
between contextual effects and endogenous effects.  Third, there cannot be collinearity between 
the regressors contained in i X  and  () g i Y , so that individual and contextual effects may be 
distinguished.   
The conditions of the Theorem are sufficient, and clearly one could find weaker ones 
than those we have employed. An advantage of the conditions we have used is that they make 
clear what underlying properties are needed for identification and so should provide a guide to 
developing weaker conditions if needed in a particular context.  
The identification theorem applies to more general models than that studied in Section 
III.ii. as the econometric model allows for a distinct  l J  for each choice.  This is appealing as one 
can easily imagine cases where the payoff from conforming to the behavior of others depends on 
the nature of the choice.  For example, if one is choosing between a solitary and a group activity, 




Identification may also be established for the case where individual decisions depend on 
the expected percentages of individuals making each of the other choices as well as on the  20 
expected percentage of individuals making that choice. Formally, this means replacing (14) and 
(15) with 
() () () ()
1 exp 1
e
I l l i lli gi gi
l i
Z kc Xd Y J p l ββ β β ω
−  ′′ ′ ++ + = 
 ∑ ∏ (17)
 
and 
() () () exp
e
Il l i l l gi gi
l i
Zk c X d Y J p ββ β β
 ′′ ′ =+ + + 
 ∑ ∏ (18)
 
For (17) and (18),  l J  is a vector () 1, 1, ... lL l JJ −  and represents the weights, conditional on choice l 
that agent i assigns to the percentage of the population making each of the choices;  ()
e
g i p  is the 
vector of expected choice percentages. Such a generalization is also appealing in various 
contexts.  Suppose one is making a choice of religious affiliation in a population. It might be the 
case that the adherence to one affiliation is affected by the percentages of the population that 
adhere to certain other denominations For example, adherence to a particular affiliation that 
believes in creationism may be affected by the percentage of adherents to other Christian 
denominations that possess similar beliefs.
6  This generalization is also interesting because it 
allows for the possibility that there is negative social utility associated with particular cross-
choice effects.
7  Hence, the expected percentage of the population making one choice can 
negatively affect the payoff for other choices.  To extend our earlier example, this would allow 
for the expected percentage of religious believers in a population to reduce the payoffs associated 
                                                 
6 The existence of self-consistent equilibria under these more general forms of 
endogenous social interactions is a consequence of Brouwer’s fixed theorem in the same way as 
was the case for the initial multinomial logit model. 
7 In the previous models we have analyzed, J and  l J  are allowed to take on negative 
values, but no cross-choice effects are present.  21 
with agnosticism or atheism, whereas no cross-choice effects exist between these two 
possibilities.  
  The conditions for identification for the model defined by (17) and (18) with expectations 
described by (16) is very similar to that of Theorem 2. Formally, we have the following 
corollary. 
 
Corollary 1. Identification for generalized multinomial logit model with social interactions 
 
Suppose that individual choice is described by eq. (17) with self-consistent beliefs defined by eq. 
(16). Denote  () , () , () , 0 g il gil gi mpp =− .  If, in addition to the assumptions found in Theorem 2, the 
support of the set of vectors  () () () , 1 () , 1 ,... gi gi gi L mmm − =  does not lie in a proper linear subspace of 
1 L R
− , then the true set of model parameters () 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 ,,,, , , , , LL L L kcdJ k c d J −− − − K  is identified 
relative to any distinct alternative. 
 
  Intuitively, the additional condition in the Corollary adds sufficient variability in 
aggregate choice probabilities to allow for identification of the individual elements of  l J .  This 
additional variability allows us to mimic the proof of Theorem 2 and apply it to Corollary 1 as 
shown in the Technical Appendix. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the multinomial and binary choice models contain an 
interesting difference with respect to the presence of zero restrictions on the model parameters.  
Unlike the binary choice model, for the multinomial choice model there may be zero restrictions 
on particular elements of  , , , ll l l kcdJ  that apply to one choice but not another.  This means, for 
example, that a variable that is relevant for two of the choices may be known to be irrelevant for 
the others.  However, since choices are determined by payoff maximization as in (1), the absence 
of a regressor in the payoff for a given possibility does not mean that it is irrelevant to whether 
that possibility is chosen.  This reasoning suggests that there may be ways to employ regressors 
that are omitted from given choice-specific payoffs to identify those choice parameters. This may 
also prove to be a route for finding choice-specific instrumental variables as needed in various 
forms of the model.   
  22 
 
IV.  Multinomial choice under alternative error assumptions 
 
The basic logic of the multinomial model is straightforward to generalize.  This can be 





il il il il VhJ pβ ε − =+ +  (19) 
 
This is the same preference structure we worked with earlier, except that β  is now explicitly 
used to index the intensity of choice (in the McFadden sense) rather than as a parameter of the 
distribution of the random payoff term , il ε .  We assume that these unobserved utility terms are 
independent and identically distributed with a common distribution function  () Fε ⋅ . 





,0 , , ,0 , ,0
,1 , , ,1 , ,1
,...,
ee
ii l i l i i l i
ee





εε β β −− −
 −≤ − + −





Following Anderson, dePalma, and Thisse (1992, pg. 36), conditional on a realization of  , il ε , the 
probability that l is chosen is 
 
  () ,, , , ,
ee
il i j il i j il
ji
Fh h J p J p ε βββ β ε
≠
−+ − + ∏  (21) 
 
which immediately implies that the probability of the choice l without conditioning on the 
realization of  , il ε  is 
 
  () ,, , , ,
ee
il il i j il i j
jl
p Fh h J p J p d F εε βββ β ε
≠
=− + − + ∏ ∫ . (22)  23 
 
Eq. (22) provides a multinomial choice model whose structure is fully analogous to the 
multinomial logit structure developed in Sections II and III. Under self-consistency, the 
aggregate choice probabilities of this general multinomial choice model are the solutions to  
() ll j l j h
jl
p Fh h J p J p d F d F εε βββ β ε
≠
=− + − + ∏ ∫∫ (23)
 
  As in the multinomial logit case, the compound parameter  J β  plays a critical role in 
determining the number of self-consistent equilibrium choice probabilities  l p .  This finding is 
formalized in Theorem 3. 
 
Theorem 3. Uniqueness versus multiplicity of self-consistent equilibria in multinomial 
choice models  
 
Suppose that individual choices and associated self-consistent equilibria are described by (22) 
and (23).  Assume that  , 0 il h =  , il ∀ and  , il ε  are independent across i and l. There exists a 
threshold  T such that if  JT β < , then there is a unique self-consistent equilibrium, whereas if 
JT β > there exist at least three self-consistent equilibria. 
 
  The relationship between  J β  and the number of equilibria is less precise than was found 
in Theorem 1, the multinomial logit case, as Theorem 3 does not specify anything about the way 
in which L, the number of available choices, affects the number of equilibria.  This lack of 
precision is to be expected since we did not specify the distribution of the errors. 
One can also develop an analog to the identification results we have obtained for the 
multinomial logit model.  We will work with the same normalizations as used in the multinomial 
logit case and will again assume that  , il ε  is independent of  i X  and  () g i Y  , il ∀  .  Under self 
consistency, eq. (22) defines a continuous mapping (23) from the simplex  
  24 
() 01 ,..., | 0, 0,..., 1, 1 def L l l
l
Sp p p jL p −

=≥ = − = 
 ∑ (24)
 
into itself.  Assume that this mapping is globally one-to-one.  This is a “high level” assumption 
in the sense that it is an assumption that is imposed on the choice probabilities; ideally it is 
preferable to place assumptions on the payoff function and show that such a condition holds.  
However, for our purposes, the assumption should not be regarded as too extreme as it holds for 
standard cases such as the multinomial logit.   
Global invertibility provides a route to identification.  Recall that nonidentification means 
that there exist two sets of parameters that produce the same choice probabilities  , il p  and hence 
the same choice probability differences  ,, 0 il i p p − .  It is immediate that this invariance requires 
that if there exist two distinct sets of parameters () 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 ,,,, , , , , LL L L kcdJ k c d J −− − − K  and 
() 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 ,,,, , , , , LL L L kcdJ k c d J −− − − K  that are observationally equivalent in the sense that the 
individuals choice probabilities they induce are equal, that  
 
() () ,( ) , 0 ,( ) , 0 ll i l l g i l l ll i l l g i l l kc X d Y J pp kc X d Y J pp ′′ ′′ ++ +− = ++ +− . (25)
 
Eq. (25) is the same condition that was analyzed in the proof of Theorem 2 (compare with (A.7) 
in the Technical Appendix).  The proof of Theorem 2 can therefore be adapted step by step to 
this case, allowing us to state Theorem 4. 
 
Theorem 4. General parametric identification for the multinomial choice model   
 
Let the true data generating process be given by (17)-(21) with the normalization     
00 0 0 0,  0,   0 ,  0 kc dJ == = =  and  =1 β .  Assume that the error distribution Fε  is known.   
Assume that the mapping defined by (23) is globally one-to-one.  Then the true set of model 
parameters  () 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 ,,,, , , , , LL L L kcdJ k c d J −− − − K  is identified relative to any distinct alternative 
under the same assumptions  ... iv i i  as found in Theorem 2. 
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  Taken together, Theorems 3 and 4 show that our basic analysis of social interactions 
using the multinomial logit model are not driven by the specific random payoff distribution that 




V.  Group choice and behavior choice 
 
Our analysis so far has treated groups as predetermined.  For contexts such as ethnicity or 
gender this is presumably appropriate. However, in other contexts, such as residential 
neighborhoods, group memberships are themselves presumably influenced by the presence of 
social interactions effects.  Hence a complete model of the role of social interactions on 
individual and group outcomes requires a joint description of both the process by which groups 
are formed and the subsequent behaviors they induce.  As yet, the literature on social interactions 
has not fully developed this joint approach.  In particular, analyses such as Glaeser, Sacerdote, 
and Scheinkman (1996) and Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) that focus on the micro structure of 
social interactions using interacting particle systems methods, have treated the interaction 
structures under study as exogenous.  In contrast, models such as Bénabou (1993,1996) and 
Durlauf (1996a,b) that have focused on the determinants of groups (in both cases neighborhoods) 
have been less concerned with the modeling of the structure of social interactions.  
Further, the failure to account for the way groups form may have important econometric 
implications.  As discussed in Brock and Durlauf (2001b), and Manski (2000) and Moffitt 
(2001), endogenous neighborhood choice has important implications for econometric 
implementation of models of neighborhood effects.  Yet endogeneity of neighborhood 
memberships need not be an impediment to identifying neighborhood effects.  Brock and 
Durlauf (2001b) in fact show, that self-selection into neighborhoods, when correctly specified, 
can facilitate identification via the creation of additional determinants of individual behavior in 
linear models and/or by inducing nonlinearities in individual behavior, each of which eliminates 
possible collinearity between contextual effects and endogenous effects.  
                                                 
8 One limitation of Theorem 3 is that it assumes that the distribution function Fε  is 
known.  We are currently exploring identification in the case where Fε  is unknown.  26 
In this section, we outline two approaches for the integration of group determination and 
individual choice in the presence of social interactions.  First, we consider the integration of 
group choices into a linear model of behavior.  Second, we integrate group and behavioral 
choices into a common multinomial choice framework.
9  We will not derive these models from 
an explicit formulation of preferences as our goal is to characterize the probability structure of 
behavioral choices in the presence of endogenous group memberships.  
 
i.  linear in means models and endogenous group membership 
 
One approach to integrating group choice and behavioral decisions may be developed by 
integrating group choice into a model in which the behavior obeys a linear model.  Such models 
are quite common in the empirical literature on social interactions and have been studied by 
Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b), Manski (1993), and Moffitt (2001).  Following the formulation in 
Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b), behavioral choices  i ω  are continuous and are described by 
() () i i gi gi i kc X d Y J m ωε ′′ =+ + + + (26)
 
Relative to the multinomial choice model of behaviors, a key difference in this 
specification is that the possible  i ω  values are ordered.  Suppose that each individual assigns to 
each group an overall “quality” measure  
*
,, , ig ig ig IZ γ ν ′ =+ (27)
                                                 
9Other approaches also appear promising in terms of understanding the interplay between 
social interactions and group formation for particular environments.  For example, Ekelund, 
Heckman, and Nesheim (2001) show how prices associated with residential neighborhood 
memberships contain important information that may be used to uncover social interaction 
effects.  Another important approach is due to Epple and Sieg (1999) who show how to develop 
implications for the distribution of families across communities in Tiebout-type environments. 
  27 
 
where  , ig Z  denotes those observable characteristics of i that influence his evaluation of group 
g and  , ig ν  denotes an unobservable individual-specific quality term. Individual i is assumed to 
be a member of the group with the highest 
*
, ig I .  We assume that  () , ,, 0 ii gi g EX Y Z ε =  and 
() ,, ,, 0 ig i g ig EX Y Z ν = . , ig ∀ .   Also, we assume that the variance of  i ε , 
2
ε σ , and the correlation 
between  i ε  and  , ig ν , ρ , are independent of group membership.  This is more restrictive than the 
assumptions made in Lee (1983); we make this stronger assumption in order to avoid 
unnecessary complications. 
The formulation we have described raises interesting econometric issues.  Specifically, 
the model embodies two major issues that have been studied in the econometrics literature.  First, 
eq. (26), known as the linear-in-means-model, has been shown to suffer from serious 
identification problems in the absence of endogenous group membership. Specifically, Manski 
(1993) has shown that if there is a one-to-one correspondence between  i X  and  () g i Y  among the 
independent variables that appear in (26), (i.e.  () g i Y  is the average value of  i X  within group g ), 
the parameters in (26) are not identified.  The reason for this is that under the Manski 
assumption,  () g i m  is linearly dependent on  () g i Y . Second, linear models with self-selection into 
groups have received a great deal of attention in the econometric literature because of the 
inconsistency of ordinary least squares estimates of (26).  The basic problem with self-selection 
is that in such cases one needs to account for the possibility that  ( | ) 0 i Ei g ε ∈≠ , a property that 
will hold if  i ε  and  , ig ν  are correlated.  
Our goal in the subsequent discussion is to show how one can identify the parameters of 
the model we have described.  The identification problem will be shown to revolve around the 
explicit incorporation of a self-selection correction into the behavioral equation (26). Heckman 
(1979) represents the seminal work in how to address the effects of this type of sample selection. 
Lee (1983) has developed an approach to dealing with self-selection that we employ here.  We 
emphasize that our purpose is illustrative in that we demonstrate identifiability only under a 
particular set of parametric assumptions.  However, the logic of our argument is more general 
than the case we study and can be adapted to alternative sets of assumptions. Also, it is important  28 
to note that Ioannides and Zabel (2002b) recognized previously that an argument in Brock and 
Durlauf (2001b) on the use of self-selection correction to achieve identification in models with 
two groups could be extended to multiple groups when group membership follows a multinomial 
logit framework.  Our derivation differs from theirs in two respects. First, we employ an 
approach to selection correction developed by Lee (1983) rather than that due to Dubin and 
McFadden (1984); the relative merits of the two are discussed in Schmertmann (1994) and Vella 
(1997). Second, we analyze how the nonlinearity of a selection correction affects identification.
10 
We require two assumptions.  First we assume  , ig ν  is double exponentially distributed as 
in eq. (4). Then, following Lee (1983, pg. 511 eq. (3.6)) the distribution function  () g Λ⋅  is 


















where relative to (4) parameterβ  is normalized to equal 1.  This is the function that appears in 
(30) below.  This assumption therefore means that the group choices obey the multinomial logit 
model we have already developed.  Second, we assume that  , ig ε  is normally distributed; we 
denote the density and distributions of the standardized normal,  (0,1) N  as  ( ) φ ⋅  and  ( ) Φ⋅  
respectively. 
These assumptions allow one to transform (26) in such a way as to produce a model that 
accounts for  ( | ) 0 i Ei g ε ∈≠ . Following Lee (1983, pg. 511, eq. (3.7)), whose analysis extends 
the argument that underlies Heckman (1979), one may rewrite (26) as  
                                                 
10One may also consider issues raised by unobservables which do not involve self 
selection for the linear-in-means model.  For example, Graham and Hahn (2003) study a version 
of (26) where k  is replaced by  g k . They explore alternative GMM and instrumental variables 
methods to identify the parameters of (26). Brock and Durlauf (2001b) discuss routes to 
identification that, for example, use differencing within groups to eliminate  g k  for this context.    29 

















=   Λ 
(30)
 
 The  function  () g i ϕ  is ungainly, but is invaluable in terms of identification.  In fact, there 
are two routes to identification in the model that are facilitated by the selection correction.  To 
see this, it is easiest to follow Manski’s assumption on the relationship between  i X  and  () g i Y  and 
consider 
  
,( ) ( ) ( ) ,( ) ,( ) () i igi gi gi igi igi kc X d X J m Z ε ω ρ σ ϕγ ξ ′′ ′ =+ + + − + (31)
If 0 ρ = , then this model is not identified.  In contrast, suppose that  0 ρ ≠ and that  () g i m  
is not an element of  ,( ) igi Z . In this case  () , () () g ii g i Z ϕγ ′  is an individual-specific variable whose 
group level average does not appear in (30).  As shown in Brock and Durlauf (2001a, Theorem 
6), the presence of such a regressor means that identification of the regression parameters in (30) 
is possible.
11 Alternatively, suppose that  ,( ) ,( ) igi igi Zm = , so that (outside unobserved 
heterogeneity), the only variable that influences group choices is the expected average behavior 
within the neighborhood. In this case, (30) is now a nonlinear in means model, in the sense that 
i ω  is linearly related to  () () () () g ig i g i Jm m ε ρ σ ϕγ − .  Brock and Durlauf (2001b, Theorem 7) show 
that nonlinear in means models of this type are locally identified, except for “hairline” cases.  
                                                 
11 The condition is necessary, rather than sufficient, but the presence of the variable 
breaks the necessary linear dependence of  () g i m  on  () g i Y   30 
Intuitively, the nonlinear relationship between  i ω  and  () g i m  precludes  () g i m  from being linearly 
dependent when  () () g ig i YX = .
12   
This argument thus generalizes the analysis of identification and self-selection found in 
Brock and Durlauf (2001b, pp. 3328-3331). The key message for empirical work is that self-
selection, if properly accounted for, can facilitate the identification of social interactions. 
 
ii.  a nested choice approach to integration behaviors and group memberships 
 
A second approach to endogenizing group memberships may be developed using the 
nested logit framework originated by Ben Akiva (1973) and McFadden (1978).  The basic idea 
of this framework is the following.  An individual is assumed to make a joint decision of a group 
{0,... 1} gG ∈−  and a behavior  {0,... 1} lL ∈− . We will denote the group choice of i as  i δ .  The 
structure of this joint decision is nested in the sense that the choices are assumed to have a 
structure that allows one to decompose the decisions as occurring in two stages: first, the group 
is chosen and then the behavior.   
The key feature of this type of model is the assumption that choices at each stage obey a 





























which is the same behavioral specification as (6). Group choices are somewhat more 
complicated. In the nested logit model, group choices are assumed to obey 
                                                 
12While this nonlinearity argument holds in principle, a common concern in empirical 
work with selection corrections is the “quality” of the identification for the range of observed 
data when identification is based on a nonlinearity argument, cf. Vella (1998, pg. 135).  Hence, 
for the model we have described, the presence of an additional  i z  that is not linearly dependent 
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e
ig l ilg ilg ilg ZE hJ pε =+ + (34)
 
with  ,, ilg ε  independent and doubly exponentially distributed random variables across i and l for 
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Combining, (31)-(34), the joint group membership and behavior probabilities for an individual 
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This probabilistic description may be faulted in that (35) is not directly derived from a 
utility maximization problem. In fact, a number of papers have identified conditions under which 
(35) is consistent with utility maximization, cf. McFadden (1978) and Borsch-Supan (1990) for 
discussion. A simple condition (cf. Anderson, dePalma, and Thisse, 1992, pg. 48) that renders 
(35) compatible with a well posed utility maximization problem is  g ββ ≤ , which in essence  32 
requires that the dispersion of random payoff terms across groups is lower than the dispersion in 
random payoff terms across behavioral choices within a group.  
There has yet to be any analysis of models such as (35) when self-consistency is imposed 
on the expected group choice percentages  ,,
e
ilg p . Such an analysis should provide a number of 
interesting results. For example, a nested structure of this type introduces a new mechanism by 
which multiple equilibria may emerge, namely the influence of beliefs about group behaviors on 
group memberships, which reciprocally will affect behaviors.  This additional channel for social 





This paper has described an approach to modeling social interactions that extends 
standard tools in the discrete choice literature, namely logit models of choice.  The approach 
allows for the incorporation of a range of alternative types of social interactions into individual 
decisionmaking in a way that retains the logic of economic behavior while at the same time 
provides additional richness to the determinants of individual behavior.  A virtue of the approach 
is that the theoretical model can be directly taken to data, both in the sense that the description of 
equilibrium choices is simultaneously a likelihood function and because the various group 
influences embedded in the model are identifiable under intuitive and reasonably weak 
conditions.  This has been demonstrated through the analysis of a leading case, namely, a 
multinomial logit version of the model. We have also shown that the qualitative theoretical and 
econometric features of our leading case, the multinomial logit model, also apply to alternative 
formulations of the random payoff process.  Finally, we have illustrated how one can integrate 
choices about group memberships with choices on behaviors using a nested multinomial logit 
model. 
More generally, we believe that there is wide scope for the better integration of 
sociological ideas and economic reasoning to provide a deeper understanding of the various 
phenomena that engage both disciplines. An important feature of the new social economics 
(Durlauf and Young (2001)) is that it attempts to take account of phenomena ranging from crime 
to fertility to education where sociological factors would seem to play a key role.  Economists  33 
have long understood the importance of addressing such factors.  Arrow (1974), for example, 
remarks 
 
“…there are profound difficulties with the price system, even, so to speak, within its own logic, 
and these strengthen the view that, valuable though it is in certain realms, it cannot be made the 
arbiter of social life,” (pg. 21-22) 
 
The models we analyze address one aspect of the general issues raised by Arrow and others by 
embedding individual choice in contexts where social factors exist outside the realm of markets 
or prices.  In turn, we believe that the choice-based approach we have developed is valuable in 
terms of providing a logical structure to sociological-style arguments. One reason for this 
judgment is that social explanations of aggregate phenomena are most useful when the implied 
rules for individual behavior are interpretable as purposeful decisions.  Arrow (1994) makes 
precisely this argument: 
 
“It is a salutary check on any theory of the economy or any other part of society that the 
explanations make sense on the basis of the individuals involved.” (pg.3) 
 
The theoretical and econometric approach we advocate is inspired by and attempts to implement 
Arrow’s vision.  34 
Technical Appendix 
 
Proof of Theorem 1 
 
In verifying this theorem, it is convenient to rewrite eq. (8) so as to measure the deviation 
of choice probabilities from  0 l = ; i.e. we work with  0 ll mpp =−  and  ,,, 0 il il i gh h =− , 
1... 1 lL =− .  The probability differences  l m  may be written as 
 












Wg J m ββ
−
=
=+ + ∑ (A.2)
 
Letting  () 11 ,..., L mm m − =  and () 11 ,..., L gg g − = , the  1 L−  equations defined by (A.1) and (A.2) 
constitute a mapping from 
1 [1 , 1 ]
L− −  to 
1 [1 , 1 ]
L− −  which we denote as  () ,, mJ g ψβ .  Fixed points 
of the mapping are defined by  () ,, mm J g ψβ = and constitute the self-consistent equilibria of 
the model.  The question of the relationship between the behavioral parameters of the model and 
the number of equilibria may be answered by determining how this mapping changes as  J β  
changes under the assumptions of the theorem. 
Under the assumption that  , il hk =  , il ∀ , it is of course the case that  0 g = , since there are 
no differences in the private deterministic utility differences between choices.  This assumption 
allows the analysis to focus entirely on the effect of  J β . Under this assumption, there exists a 
fixed point  0 m =  for any value of J β .  To see whether other fixed points exist, we compute the 
derivative of  () ,, 0 mJ ψβ  with respect to m  at the fixed point  0 m = .  The Jacobian matrix of 
derivatives of  () ,, 0 mJ ψβ  taken with respect to elements of m  contains diagonal elements  35 
() ()
()




exp 1 exp ,, 0 e x p






JJ m J m mJ J J m
m
Jm Jm










and off-diagonal elements 


























so for  0 m = , 
 
  () 0, ,0









 (A.5)   
 
Consider the set of vectors m  of the form () 1,0 m , i.e. vectors with zero components 
except for the first element.  Denote the set of all such vectors by  1 Γ .  Observe that  1 Γ , which 
lies in 
1 L R
− , is an invariant set with respect to  () ,, 0 mJ ψβ as each element of   1 Γ  maps onto an 
element of  1 Γ .  We now focus on the first component of the ψ  map,  1 ψ , which can always be 
written as a one-dimensional map on R , denote this as  () 1, mJ ρβ . 
Finally, consider fixed points for the mapping  () 1, mJ ρβ .  One fixed point exists, as 










  36 
It is easy to verify that ρ  is a convexo-concave function with respect to its first argument.  This 




 becomes greater than 1, two new fixed points must emerge.  This argument is 
sufficient to verify Theorem 1. 
 
 
Proof of Theorem 2 
 
This proof is a generalization of the proof for identification for a binary choice model in 
Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b) which in turns develops a mode of argument found in Manski 
(1988).  Suppose that for () 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 ,,,, , , , , LL L L kcdJ k c d J −− − − K , the set of true parameters for the 
multinomial choice model, there exists another vector () 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 ,,,, , , , , LL L L kcdJ k c d J −− − − K that 
generates the same observed data.  If both sets of parameters generate the same probabilities for 
the observables, this implies,  
 
() () () 0, ( ) ,0 , ( ) ,0 ln / l i i l li l l g i l l l l li l l g i l l l p p k cX dY J p p k cX dY J p p ′′ ′′ =+ + + − =+ + + −  (A.7) 
for 1,..., 1 lL =− .  From assumption iv of the Theorem, there is at least one neighborhood for 
each choice l such that within that neighborhood,  , il X  is not contained in a proper linear 
subspace of 
r R . Hence, (A.7) can hold if and only if  ll cc = .  This argument applies to each of 
the possible choices, so   11 ,..., L cc −  are identified. 
Given that  11 ,..., L cc −  are identified, it must be the case that the Theorem is true if JJ = ; 
lack of identification would imply that either 1) () ,( ) , , il gi l XY  lies in a proper linear subspace of 
rs R
+ , which would violate assumption i of the theorem or 2) that some linear combination of 
elements in () ,( ) , , il gi l XY  is constant, which would violate assumption iii.  We can therefore 
restrict attention to the case JJ ≠ .    Define  () , () , () , 0 g il gil gi mpp =− . Notice that  () , g il m  is bounded 
between -1 and 1.  Since  11 ,..., L cc −  are identified, (A.7) requires that 
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() () () , () , ll ll g i l llg i l kk dd Y JJ m ′′ −+ − = − (A.8)
 
since  ll cc = l ∀ .  Since  ,( ) lgi m  cannot be zero for all  ( ) gi by assumption vi and since assumption 
v implies that () () , ll g i l dd Y ′′ −  is unbounded if  ll dd ≠ , we have a contradiction to the boundedness 
of () () , ll g i l JJ m −  unless  ll dd = . 
Failure of identification now requires that 
 
() () , ll llg i l kk JJ m −= − (A.9)
 
holds across all groups. Given assumption vi, the nonconstancy of  ,( ) lni p  (and thus () , g il m ) across 
groups, can only hold across neighborhoods if  ll JJ = .  Substituting this into (A.7), it is obvious 
that  ll kk =  which completes the proof. 
 
 
Proof of Corollary 1. 
  
  Following the proof of Theorem 2, Corollary 1 will be proved if one can show that 
 
() () () 0, ( ) ,0 , ( ) ,0 ln / l i i l li l l g i l l l l li l l g i l l l p p k cX dY J p p k cX dY J p p ′′ ′ ′′ ′ =+ + + − =+ + + − (A.10)
 
cannot hold for any () 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 ,,,, , , , , LL L L kcdJ k c d J −− − − K  distinct from 
() 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 ,,,, , , , , LL L L kcdJ k c d J −− − − K .  The argument made immediately after (A.7) applies to 
(A.10) as well, which means that   11 ,..., L cc −  are identified.  Similarly, the argument made after 
(A.8) applies to (A.10) which implies that  11 ,..., L dd −  are identified. Hence, we can restrict our 
attention to   38 
() () ll ll g i kk JJm ′ −= − (A.11)
 
 Given the assumption of the Corollary that the support of  () g i m  does not lie in a proper linear 
subspace of 
1 L R




Proof of Theorem 3 
 
To verify Theorem 3, we follow the same logic as the proof for Theorem 1.  Define the 
mapping 
 
() ,, 0 li l i h mp p d F =− ∫ (A.12)
 
1... 1 lL =− .  By eq. (23) in the text, this defines a mapping  () 1,0, , mJ ψβ β  from m  to m .  
Under the assumption that  , 0 il h =  , il ∀ , it is straightforward to verify that  () 11 ,0 m Γ=  is an 
invariant set under this mapping.  Hence, in parallel to the proof of Theorem 1, there is a 
mapping  () 1,, mJ ρβ β  from R  to R  such that  
 
() ( ) 11 1 ,, , 0 ,, mJ m J ρβ β ψ β β = (A.13)
 
 
Under the assumptions that  , 0 il h =  , il ∀ and  , il ε  are independent across i and l, it is 
immediate that  1 0 m =  must be a fixed point of this mapping.  The existence of other fixed points 
will depend on the derivative of  () ,, ρ ⋅⋅⋅ at  1 0 m = . 
To analyze this derivative, note that   39 
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since 0 l m =  for  2,..., 1 lL =− .  Further, given the assumptions that  , 0 il h =  , il ∀ and  , il ε  are 
independent across i and l,  ,1 ,0 1 ii p pm −=. Therefore, we can define a map  A from  1 m  to itself 
such that 
 
() 11 ,, mAJ m L ββ = (A.15)
 
This function, which is clearly monotonic and bounded between -1 and 1, depends on L 
through the products in (A.12) via (A.14). The derivative of this function is () 1,, JA Jm L ββ β ′ . 
Consider () 0, , JA L ββ ′ , the derivative of the function at the fixed point  1 0 m = .  Following the 
same argument in the proof of Theorem 1, if  () 0, , 1 JA L ββ ′ < , then the fixed point  1 0 m =  is 
unique whereas if  () 0, , 1 JA L ββ ′ >  then at least two additional fixed points must exist.  Hence 
the magnitude of  J β  can be varied so as to move from a unique to multiple (at least three) 
equilibria.  This verifies Theorem 3. 
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